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The Climate Change Act of 2009 was recently signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Among the highlights of the law are:

• It establishes a Climate Change Commission which shall be an independent and autonomous body and shall have the same status as that of a national government agency. It shall be attached to the Office of the President. The Commission shall be the sole policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change pursuant to the provisions of this Act. The Commission shall be organized within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. (Section 4, RA 9729)

• The Commission shall be composed of the President of the Republic of the Philippines who shall serve as the Chairperson, and three (3) Commissioners to be appointed by the President, one of whom shall serve as the Vice Chairperson of the Commission. (Section 5, RA 9729)

• The Commission shall meet once every three (3) months, or as often as may be deemed necessary by the Chairperson. The Chairperson may likewise call upon other government agencies for the proper implementation of this Act. (Section 6, RA 9729)

• The Commissioners must be Filipino citizens, residents of the Philippines, at least thirty (30) years of age at the time of appointment, with at least ten (10) years of experience on climate change and of proven honesty and ntegrity. The Commissioners shall be experts in climate change by virtue of their educational background, training and experience: Provided, That at least one (1) Commissioner shall be female: Provided, further, That in no case shall the Commissioners come from the same sector: Provided, finally, That in no case shall any of the Commissioners appoint representatives to act on their behalf. The Commissioners shall hold office for a period of six (6) years, and may be subjected to reappointment: Provided, That no person shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms: Provided, further, That in case of a vacancy, the new appointee shall fully meet the qualifications of a Commissioner and shall hold office for the unexpired portion of the term only: Provided, finally, That in no case shall a Commissioner be designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The Vice Chairperson and the Commissioners shall have the rank and privileges of a Department Secretary and Undersecretary, respectively. They shall be entitled to corresponding compensation and other emoluments and shall be subject to the same disqualifications. (Section 7, RA 9729)

Read more on the Climate Change Act of 2009 in our Recent Laws Page.

In a Resolution promulgated last 25 November 2009, the Supreme Court granted Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed its 11 September 2009 Decision disqualifying Penera as mayor of Sta. Monica in Surigao del Norte. In finding for Penera, the Supreme Court ruled that election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed. Thus:

“In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.”

As a general rule, a divorce obtained abroad between two Filipino citizens is not valid or recognized in the Philippines. This is due to Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that “laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”. Moreover, Paragraph 3 of Article 17 of the same Code states that “prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country”. 

The only exception is found in Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which states that “where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

However, given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? This was the novel question faced by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Orbecido.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.  Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.  A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.  Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.  No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same.  The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In its petition, the OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.  The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation.  The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. For his part, Cipriano admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

In finding for Orbecido, the Court held that:

“Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.  The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.  To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.  Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.  A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.”

The Court held further that:

“The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.  As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.  Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.  Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.”

The Court was also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.  Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity.  On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

If you do find yourself in a situation similar to that of Cipriano and want to re-marry, it would be important for you to prove your allegation that your spouse was naturalized as an American citizen and you must likewise prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, you must also show that the divorce decree allows your former spuse to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.  Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that your former spouse is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

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The Commission on Elections has dismissed the petition for disqualification filed by lawyer Oliver Lozano against former President Joseph Estrada. The Lozano petition sought to disqualify Estrada from joining the 2010 presidential elections due to Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In dismissing the petition, the COMELEC noted that there is nothing to oppose since Estrada had not yet filed his certificate of candidacy (COC). The period for the filing of the of COCs will be from November 20 to 30, 2009.

In a related development, Lozano has filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC’s dismissal claiming that a COC is not required if a petition similar to what he filed against Estrada is based on the need to prohibit something not allowed by the Constitution. Lozano also said he is preparing a graft complaint against officials of the Comelec, including chairman Jose Melo, for allegedly causing “undue injury” to him and giving “undue benefit” to Estrada.