Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy."  Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.  Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective.  However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).  Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected.

The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same.  Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.

When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.  Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form of bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes of failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. For example, a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or personal differences with his employer may be validly dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable ground. A working mother who has also to take care of her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance, this being another authorized ground. It is not the employee's fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to maintain him just the same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly replaced. Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause.

An assignment of credit is an act of transferring, either onerously or gratuitously, the right of an assignor to an assignee who would then be capable of proceeding against the debtor for enforcement or satisfaction of the credit.  The transfer of rights takes place upon perfection of the contract, and ownership of the right, including all appurtenant accessory rights, is thereupon acquired by the assignee.  The assignment binds the debtor only upon acquiring knowledge of the assignment but he is entitled, even then, to raise against the assignee the same defenses he could set up against the assignor.  Where the assignment is on account of pure liberality on the part of the assignor, the rules on donation would likewise be pertinent; where valuable consideration is involved, the assignment partakes of the nature of a contract of sale or purchase.