In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession. The legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of action, for no one may take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were questionable or actually disputed in another case. If the plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.

The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such a trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate, (Marapao v. Mendoza, 119 SCRA 97, Sy Cao v. CA, 132 SCRA 302). It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium.

Now, there is no gainsaying that loss of confidence is a recognized ground for the discharge of an employee from employment. But such a ground must be founded from facts established by substantial evidence. And the burden of establishing such facts as reasonably cause loss of confidence in an employee  such facts as reasonably generate belief by the employer that the employee is connected with some misconduct and the nature of his participation therein is such as to render him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position  is on the employer. The fact that the employee has been absolved in a criminal prosecution involving said misconduct does not preclude the employer from attempting to prove the same before the labor arbiter or the latter from accepting that evidence as sufficient foundation for a finding of lawful termination of employment. Withal, the employer's evidence, although not required to be of such degree as is required in criminal cases, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, must be substantial, must clearly and convincingly establish the facts upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest.

It must be recalled that the complaint of private respondent alleged that the articles of incorporation of petitioner contained this prohibition: “without, however, engaging in pawnbroking as defined in PD 114” and despite this restriction, petitioner allegedly continued to actually operate and do business as a pawnshop.  The complaint thus treats of a violation of petitioner’s primary franchise.  Section 5 of PD 114, the same law invoked by petitioner, mandates that a corporation desiring to engage in the pawnshop business must first register with the SEC.  Without question, the complaint filed by private respondent against petitioner called upon the SEC to exercise its adjudicatory and supervisory powers.  By law, the SEC has absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations that are enfranchised to act as corporate entities. A violation by a corporation of its franchise is properly within the jurisdiction of the SEC.