Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

The validity of self-defense is premised on the impossibility on the part of the State to at all times prevent aggression upon its people.  Founded in the human instinct to protect, repel and save one's person from impending danger or peril, the right of self-defense justifies measures taken by one who is attacked and placed in a situation where he either has to forfeit his life or has to take the life of his assailant.  Nevertheless, the application of this justifying circumstance, in this context, requires a clear showing 1) that the victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self defense; 2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and 3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim's aggression. 

The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. When there is an invasion of primary rights, then and not until then does the adjective or remedial law become operative, and under it arise rights of action. There can be no right of action until there has been a wrong  a violation of a legal right  and it is then given by the adjective law.

We have already held that when a labor union accuses an employer of acts of unfair labor practice allegedly committed during a given period of time, the charges should include all acts of unfair labor practice committed against any and all members of the union during that period. The union should not, upon dismissal of the charges first preferred, be allowed to split its cause of action and harass the employer with subsequent charges based upon acts committed during the same period of time (Dionela, et al. v. CIR, No. L-19334, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 832 at 837). 

Petitioner conjures a supposed conflict of jurisdiction between the Central Bank and the SEC by insisting that it is only the Central Bank that has jurisdiction over violations of PD 114.  The argument is misplaced.  Basic is the rule that it is the allegations in the complaint that vests jurisdiction. A case in point is Philippine Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, Inc. vs. Abiertas House of Friendship, Inc. wherein we held that when the thrust of a complaint is on the ultra vires act of a corporation, that is the complained act of a corporation is contrary to its declared corporate purposes, the SEC has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint before it.