To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Arts. 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code to the result of the criminal prosecution would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action when, on the contrary, the law provides that such civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding and regardless of the result of the latter." Art. 33 of the Civil Code contemplates a civil action for recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. This  is the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient in such civil action.

Basically, the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established.  Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.  The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question and having benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable conclusion would be that he was the one who falsified said checks. Ineluctably, the use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit.

As repeatedly expounded by this Court, evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe.  No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.  As bewailed by the court below, the theory espoused by appellant "is taxing too much the credulity of this Court, an insult to the humble intelligence and the common sense of this Court.

The issue of the constitutionality of the taking of private property under the CARP Law has already been settled by this Court holding that where the measures under challenge merely prescribe the retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power by the government, but where to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, then there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any branch or official of the government.

The petitioners contend, too, that the respondent banks have come to court with unclean hands, their filing of the petition for involuntary insolvency being an attempt to defeat validly acquired rights of domestic corporations. The Court wishes to simply point out that the effects of the institution of bankruptcy proceedings on all the creditors of the alleged bankrupt are clearly spelled out by the law, and will be observed by the Insolvency Court regardless of whatever motives apart from the desire to share in the assets of the insolvent in satisfying its credit that the party instituting the proceedings might have.