It should not be amiss to state by reference a case wherein the Supreme Court held that between an unrecorded title of a house of a prior date and a recorded mortgage of the same house of later date, the former is preferred for the reason that, if the original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing sold, then he no longer had the ownership and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it.

For a conspiracy to be established, it is not necessary that all of the accused commit each and every act constitutive of the offense. "There is conspiracy where several accused, by their acts, aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments" 

The general rule is that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt thereof by the addressee. The exception is where the addressee does not claim his mail within 5 days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, in which case the service takes effect upon the expiration of such period. Inasmuch as the exception refers to only constructive and not actual service,  such exception must be applied only upon conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not applicable where there is evidence to the contrary, as in the case at bar.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of these two requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the 1987 Constitution.

There is no law that prohibits a corporate officer from binding himself personally to answer for a corporate debt. While the limited liability doctrine is intended to protect the stockholder by immunizing him from personal liability for the corporate debts, he may nevertheless divest himself of this protection by voluntarily binding himself to the payment of the corporate debts. The petitioner cannot therefore take refuge in this doctrine that he has by his own acts effectively waived.