 |
|
Topic: Lessons from The
Mark Jimenez Case
|
As the recent decision made by the Supreme Court on the extradition
case of Mark Jimenez has stirred a hornet's nest and has triggered a spate
of debates we would like to highlight and elucidate the lessons and doctrines
enunciated in the case. It is also worthy to note that the issues in the
case are novel and should have a great impact on future extradition cases.
On the issue whether Mark Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing
before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, the Supreme Court stated
that an extraditee is not entitled to such privilege and gave the proper
procedure that should be followed in extradition cases, to wit:
"Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise
to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents,
the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person
sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require
the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants
and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination,
no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined,
then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of
the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition
and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance
of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee
of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity
to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases."
On the issue whether Mark Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending, the Court held that:
"As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction
or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption
of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the
loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue."
XXX XXX
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable
in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present
case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should
apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him,
not before the extradition court.
On the issue of denial of due process as claimed by Jimenez, the Court
declared that:
"Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion
of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right
to due process. We reiterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of
due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point
out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition
case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.
In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental
fairness.
XXX XXX
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting
state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His
invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already
had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it,
he ran away.
In denying his right to bail, the Court also took notice of the fact that
the government has to fulfill its treaty obligations and that the country
cannot be a haven for those who seek to avoid extradition, thus:
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government
to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord
Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes
to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation
of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales
against the government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty
obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression
of crime. Indeed, “[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist
in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully
balanced against exigent and palpable government interests.”
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards
and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions,
choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase
the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection
or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able
to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any
provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing
the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of
not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
Related Links:
© 1999 abogadomo.com. All rights reserved.
Home|Disclaimer|Privacy
Policy
|
|
