Surprisingly, media has reported that motorists caught with wang-wangs and other prohibited devices have been fined the amount of Php 15,000.  We’re not sure what legal basis was used for this but Presidential Decree No. 96 is clear that the penalty for a first offense is mere confiscation and it is only in case of a second and subsequent offenses that the offender shall be prosecuted for violation of the Decree and, upon conviction thereof, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for six months and/or a fine of 600 pesos. In addition, the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle on which the unauthorized gadget or device herein mentioned is installed, mounted or used shall be cancelled or revoked.

In accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, Aquino and Binay will formally assume their office on June 30, 2010.

The Decision stemmed from the question on whether an incumbent President can appoint Chief Justice Puno’s successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of her term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

In its Decision, the Supreme Court, speaking through Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin held that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

The Court ratiocinated that “Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.”

 Click on this link to read a full copy of the Decision.

The Resolution was penned by no less that Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. Concurring with the Chief Justice were Justices Conchita Carpio Morales, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose P. Perez, and Jose C. Mendoza. Dissenting were Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (the ponente in the original Decision), Renato C. Corona, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P. Bersamin.

Read a copy of the Resolution here.

PROCLAIMING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE PROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO, EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN AREAS

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1946 was issued on 24 November 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato for the purpose of preventing and suppressing lawless violence in the aforesaid areas;



WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that “xxx In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety so requires it, (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law, xxx ”

WHEREAS, R.A. No. 6986 provides that the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.


WHEREAS, heavily armed groups in the province of Maguindanao have established positions to resist government troops, thereby depriving the Executive of its powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety;



WHEREAS, the condition of peace and order in the province of Maguindanao has deteriorated to the extent that the local judicial system and other government mechanisms in the province are not functioning, thus endangering public safety;



WHEREAS, the Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities dated 14 November 1997 provides the following is considered a prohibited act: “xxx establishment of checkpoints except those necessary for the GRP’s enforcement and maintainance of peace and order; and for the defense and security of the MILF in their identified areas, as jointly determined by the GRP and the MILF, xxx ”

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as follows:



SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the province of Maguindanao, except for the identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as referred to in the Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities.



SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.



DONE in the City of Manila, this 4th day of December in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Nine.


GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO


By the President:


EDUARDO R. ERMITA

Executive Secretary

In granting the petition, the Court found that petitioners’ interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and that it was “now the opportune time for the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.” In finding that there was a violation of the equal protection clause, the Court ruled that:

“In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law, explains,

The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will justify the prohibition of the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification, however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical strength is not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification for treating them differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules.

The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.

XXX          XXX         XXX

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones.  The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law.  The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.”

In finding that the challenged proviso suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad, the Court held, to wit:

“First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one’s highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy.

Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them.”

Justice Nachura was joined in the majority by Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin and Mariano C. del Castillo. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno led the dissenters with a seventy page dissenting opinion. Also filing separate dissenting opinions were Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.

• Read a full copy of Quinto and Tolentino vs. COMELEC here.
• SC dissenting opinion warns: ‘Disaster waiting to happen’ - from inquirer.net