“In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.”

In a related development, Lozano has filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC’s dismissal claiming that a COC is not required if a petition similar to what he filed against Estrada is based on the need to prohibit something not allowed by the Constitution. Lozano also said he is preparing a graft complaint against officials of the Comelec, including chairman Jose Melo, for allegedly causing “undue injury” to him and giving “undue benefit” to Estrada.

In arriving at its Decision, the Court, through Associate Justice Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr., said that pilot testing is not necessary and that the PCOS machines satisfy the minimum system capabilities prescribed by RA 8436, as amended. 

As to the issue of pilot testing the Court stated that:

“While the underscored portion makes reference to a “2007 pilot exercise,” what it really exacts is that, for the automation of the May 2010 and subsequent elections, the PCOS or any AES to be procured must have demonstrated its capability and success in either a local or a foreign electoral exercise. And as expressly declared by the provision, participation in the 2007 electoral exercise is not a guarantee nor is it conclusive of the system’s fitness.  In this regard, the Court is inclined to agree with private respondents’ interpretation of the underscored portion in question:  ”The provision clearly conveys that the [AES] to be used in the 2010 elections need not have been used in the 2007 elections, and that the demonstration of its capability need not be in a previous Philippine election. Demonstration of the success and capability of the PCOS may be in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction.” As determined by the Comelec, the PCOS system had been successfully deployed in previous electoral exercises in foreign countries, such as Ontario, Canada; and New York, USA, albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system provider. But then, RA 9369 does not call for the winning bidder of the 2010 automation project and the deploying entity/provider in the foreign electoral exercise to be one and the same entity. Neither does the law incidentally require that the system be first used in an archipelagic country or with a topography or a voting population similar to or approximating that of the Philippines.”

The Court also stated that the COMELEC should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created––to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. As to the procedural issue, the Court held that petitioners had locus standi saying that “where issues of public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed.”

Read the decision here.